Civil Procedure Code, 1908
Order 39 Rules 1 & 2—Order directing appellant to vacate the suit property and simultaneously directing respondents to provide her alternative accommodation with rent up to rupees sixty five thousand per month with associated costs—Appeal—No dispute about the ownership of the respondents/plaintiffs—Only defence of appellant is with respect to the right of residence based on the concept of shared household as defined in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act—Right of residence under the Domestic Violence Act is not absolute or permanent; it is a right of protection, not possession—Equally, the right of senior citizens to live peacefully with dignity in their own property is not subordinate to this statutory protection—While the DV Act confers a vital and protective right of residence upon an aggrieved woman, it cannot be construed to extinguish or indefinitely suspend the right of senior citizens to live without distress in their own home—Where both sets of rights intersect, the court must strike a delicate balance so that neither party’s dignity nor security is compromised—Single Judge has correctly appreciated the legal position and equities between the parties—Impugned directions, providing appellant with alternate accommodation at the cost of the respondents while directing her to vacate the suit property, are consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the DV Act, and do not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference in appeal—Appeal dismissed.
[Paras 29, 30, 34, 39 to 44]
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Section 19(1)(f)—Alternative accommodation—Contention of appellant that the alternate accommodation must be identical in size and configuration to the existing premises is misconceived—Domestic Violence Act does not guarantee parity of luxury, but adequacy of residence—Right of residence is meant to ensure safety and stability, not to perpetuate occupation of a large family home at the cost of the lawful owners.
[Para 35]